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PRE.SIDENT Hutchins' book contains a diagnosis, definitely prescribed reme-
dies, and a religion to make the remedies palatable. "The most striking fact
about the higher learning in America," President Hutchins finds, "is the
confusion that besets it." There is no "ordering principle ;" it is going off in all
directions at once; it is, in brief, chaos. The causes of this confusion, rooted
deep in the state of the nation, are many and interrelated. First is the vulgar
love of money. This makes educational policy whatever anybody-student,
donor, or legislator-is willing to pay to make it. Next, and more important,
is a misconception of democracy. This leads to two erroneous notions: that
"everybody is entitled to the same amount and the same kind of education"
and that every citizen, editor, alumnus, or trustee can qualify as an educa-
tional expert. A final major cause is our modem idea of progress. Im-
pressed by expansion of our scientific knowledge and improvement in our
technology, we have renounced our intellectual heritage, broken completely
with the past, and ended "with an anti-intellectualism which denies, in effect,
that a man is a rational animal." So much dependence of the higher learn-
ing upon external conditions-the diagnosis continues-afflicts us with a
strange circularity. "The state of the nation depends on the state of educa-
tion; but the state of education depends on the state of the nation." Witness
the three bewildering dilemmas of professionalism, isolation, and anti-intel-
lectualism. The only excuse a university can have for existence is to pro-
vide a haven where truth may be pursued for its own sake; yet public opinion
demands a vocationalism that stops at no triviality. Cooperation is badly
needed between teachers concerned with different trades and teachers pur-
suing truth; yet there is no common frame of reference; cooperation might
even increase the confusion. The ptublic and the professions are anti-intel-
lectual in temper: yet somehow people must be forced to accept intellectual
training. How are these dilemmas and all this confusion to be resolved?
The remedies proposed by President Hutchins are drastic. He demands
an evangelistic movement to remake both general education and the higher
learning. His general education would begin with the junior year in high
school and end with the sophomore year in college. From it he would exclude
body building, character building, the social graces, and tricks of trades.
For these he would substitute a curriculum of "a deeper, wider utility;" it
would seek "the good for which all other goods are only means," the culti-
vation of the intellectual virtues. The truth is everywhere and at all times
the same. An intellect properly disciplined can operate equally well in all
fields. Hence the center of his new curriculum must be "the classics," books
contemporary in any age. "permanent studies" that draw out the elements
of our common nature and link man to the best thought of the past. For
an understanding of such studies, Grammar, Rhetoric, Logic, and Mathe-
matics-as the ancients knew them-become indispensable and must be
taught. Technology is not to be excluded but would find a place only to the
extent necessary for the communication of principles. Without such a gen-
eral education, the author insists, we can never get a university. Upon its
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basic core of common knowledge and cultivation of the intellectual virtues
we might be able to erect a more intelligible higher learning.
In President Hutchins' higher learning remedies and religion become
hopelessly intertangled. "All that can be learned in a university," he states,
"is the general principles, the fundamental propositions, the theory of any
discipline." Students must, and can, be taught to think about fundamental
problems. Three categories exhaust "the proper subject matter" for higher
learning-metaphysics, the social sciences, and natural science. By natural
science the author means "the study of nature ;" he would include enough
recent observations to illustrate principles. His social sciences embrace eth-
ics, politics, economics, and "such historical and empirical materials as may
be needed" to aid in the "guidance of human action." But the gathering of
data, important as it is, has no place in his university proper; such work
must, if we are to avoid confusion, be carried on by institutes, separate from,
though established near and controlled by, the university. What function
metaphysics? It is to pervade the whole. The "common aim of all parts" of
the university, its "unifying principle," is, as indicated above, to be the pur-
suit of truth for truth's own sake. Yet such pursuit alone cannot insure
unity. Some basic, ordering, proportioning discipline, some "science of first
principles," must direct our activities. "Real unity," the author urges, "can
be achieved only by a hierarchy of truths which show us which are funda-
mental and which subsidiary, which significant and which not." In medieval
times this hierarchy was established by theology; but today we are a faith-
less generation, taking no stock in revealed truth. It is futile for us to look
to theology. We can only turn, as did the Greeks, to metaphysics. "It is in
the light of metaphysics that the social sciences, dealing with man and man,
and the physical sciences dealing with man and nature, take shape and illu-
minate one another. In metaphysics we are seeking the causes of things
that are. It is the highest science, the first science, and as first, universal.
It considers being as being, both what it is and the attributes which belong
to it as being." To get a unified university we moderns must, then, "revital-
ize metaphysics and restore it to its place in the higher learning." This
achieved, we might even be able to change the character of our civilization
and, ultimately, to establish rational order in the modern world. Yet for the
accomplishment of these miracles no "specific"--only the "most rational"-
metaphysical system is indispensable.
What is to happen to our professional schools? As such-that is, as "trade"
schools-delendae sunt. In his reformed higher learning President Hutchins
escapes the dilemma of vocationalism; he makes no distinction between pro-
fessional and non-professional disciplines. For the "gestures of varying
degrees of wildness" now made by those attempting to teach the professions
he would substitute study under his three major faculties of metaphysics,
the social sciences, and natural science. Technical institutes can be estab-
lished in connection with the university to supply any required background
of special knowledge and training in special techniques. Today the pros-
pective lawyer, for example, is diverted by attempts to teach him the art of
practice from what he might possibly learn in law school-"the theory, the
fundamental propositions, the general principles of the law." The curriculum
he studies "is confined to those subjects which experience, tradition, or the
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state examinations have sanctified." He is taught, in brief, by the cook-book
method. Yet, paradoxically, he might be better prepared even for practice
if he were trained to think in the subject matter of his discipline; "a grasp
of theory might enable him to meet practical situations which were over-
looked or not foreseen by his instructors." Hence, in the new higher learn-
ing the prospective lawyer will take his metaphysics along with the pros-
pective clergyman or doctor. This is to prepare him to master the subject
that must be central in his new curriculum: jurisprudence. Without meta-
physics, "ethics, politics, and economics are meaningless ;" and jurisprudence
"consists of ethics and politics and the philosophy of law based on them."
Yet jurisprudence is not to be the whole of legal study. To it must be added
"empirical and historical knowledge of society, the history of law and legal
institutions, economics and economic history." The tricks of his trade the
law student can learn in one of the attached institutes.
Critics have found much mystery in this book. The key is, I think, the
author's high idealism. His heroic purpose is to free universities from
the pressure groups that now dominate them and so, eventually, to free us
all, teachers and taught, from all kinds of contemporary dogmas. Yet he
cannot ignore, he would even take advantage of, the commonplace truth that
man must have a faith. "We are," he says, "as a matter of fact, living by the
haphazard, accidental, shifting shreds of a theology and metaphysics to which
we cling because we must cling to something." Let us, then, recognize our
need and get the most rational faith we can. Today the whole world needs,
as never before, a symbol that "represents an abiding faith in the highest
powers of mankind." Temporarily, too--I am interpolating here-we must
persuade the common man that the whole business of education is so occult
that he cannot hope to understand it; patients must be rendered unconscious
before major surgery. For the achievement of these paradoxical aims meta-
physics would appear, on first glance at least, to have been designed by
nature. To begin with, it can be described as the logic of logics, the super-
instrument whereby man's reason can be screwed up to the nth degree of
performance. What base for faith could be more "rational?" Better still,
after several hundred years of controversy nobody knows what metaphysics
is. What could be more occult? A skeptic can always be confounded by the
suggestion that he is, without knowing it, some particularly vicious kind of
metaphysician. The logical implications of our only language and the fact
that we must all, in our ignorance of the "universe." rely on some kind of
faith, make "proof" easy.1 Furthermore, under the label of metaphysics
faculty and students can be forced to a more critical study of all of man's
verbalizing and symbolizing activities. Such study, by sharpening our con-
ceptual tools and pointing to new problems, might even aid empirical dis-
covery; certainly it could be made to dramatize the limitations of arm-chair
speculation. Can there be any wonder-in the light of all these aims-that
the author must write with such studied ambiguity? Yet I think, as numer-
1. The author (p. 103, n. 5) cites a dilemma from Aristotle: "You say one must
philosophize. Then you must philosophize. You say one must not philosophize. Then
(to prove your contention) you must philosophize. In any case you must philoso-
phize." From this quotation I gather that the author equates philosophy and metaphy-
sics, and both with any kind of verbalizing.
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ous other critics have thought, that there are dangers in over-emphasis ol this
timeless, denatured religion President Hutchins is urging to make his reme-
dies palatable.
The obvious danger is that credulous converts may assume that meta-
physics is not merely a religion but some esoteric instrument of discovery, in-
dependent of and in competition with scientific method. President Hutchins
does, as has been seen, use the ancient words over which philosophers have
fought for so long. Even teachers may be inclined to take his words liter-
ally; the glee that greeted his first supposed desertion from the ranks of the
"realists" is well known. Logic offers no way to refute a mystic; one can,
however, ask for more details of the vision. Perhaps, because of the author's
ambiguities, a reviewer may be granted a few ancient questions. How can
general principles, fundamental propositions, and theory be divorced from
practical problems ? What is this truth that is everywhere and at all times
the same? Just-what peculiar technique for its discovery does metaphysics
offer? How does metaphysics ferret out the "causes of things that are,"
"being as being," and the "attributes of being?" If the propositions of this.
"first," "highest," and "universal" science partake of the tautology of logic,
how does the metaphysician hope-without the aid of the empiricist-to
increase man's control over his environment? If its propositions are not
tautologies but tentative hypotheses about the physical world, how is the
metaphysician different from, what are his advantages over, the empiricist?
What other kinds of propositions, if any, are there? What their source,
their test, their function? How, in detail, does metaphysics establish and
maintain its vaunted hierarchy? What kind of unity does it produce? Does
this "unity" have any consequences other than verbal? Why is "unity" a
more practicable or desirable ideal than "diversity"? Why should scholars
forsake their scientific tools to worship at the shrine of one of two polar
words? For President Hutchins, of course, these questions are as irrelevant
as they are rhetorical. He states specifically that "thinking cannot proceed
divorced from facts and from experience ;" and throughout his general edu-
cation and his higher learning, as the summaries above should indicate, he
saves room for enough facts to "illustrate" principles. In fact, the meta-
physics he advocates-no "specific," only "the most rational" system-could
even be expanded, as one of his recent defenders has insisted, to take in the
most anti-metaphysical of philosophies. "Opponents of metaphysics," this
defender writes, "attack as metaphysics precisely what Mr. Hutchins means
by a lack of metaphysics."
2
A second danger is that metaphysics can be, and often is, made to serve
the purposes not of a liberating but of an enslaving faith. "To be grandly
vague," a critic of fascism writes, "is the shortest route to power; for a
meaningless noise is that which divides us least."3 Dean Clark has pointed
to the striking similarities in the language of President Hutchins and that
2. McKeon, Education and the Disciplines (1937) 47 INT. J. ETHICS 370, 378. Em-
pirical confirmation of this can be found in the fact that the title page of Professor
Carnap's latest book bears the inscription "Professor of Philosophy in the University
of Chicago." CARNAP, THE LOGICAL SYNTAX OF LANGUAGE (1937).
3. Herman Finer, quoted in SMITH, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1936)
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of the German minister of education. 4 Unity alone is a symbol too barren
to attract followers; metaphysics, if not an instrument of discovery, cannot
create new social ideals; the rational sciences of politics and ethics have
never produced anything but commonplace talk about "individual happiness,"
"the good life," and "the common good." Certainly it wuuld appear that
metaphysics, if it is to have any effect in determining human behavior,
must be made to implement some social ideal taken from without its own
great arabesque of words. But what is to determine this choice of an ideal
from without? What is to confine it to "liberal" ideals? The fact is, as we
all know, that each of the multitudinous and conflicting "isms" today clam-
oring for our loyalty seeks, and often obtains, sanctification in its own
peculiar brand of metaphysics. What we have is a chaos of both "isms" and
metaphysical systems. Which metaphysics is the most "rational"? How does
President Hutchins propose to quell all this confusion and accomplish his
major purpose of liberating us from all kinds of nostrums, dogmas, and
"isms"? In terms all he offers is educational authoritarianism. "In the cur-
rent use of freedom," he writes, "it is an end in itself. But it must be clear
that if each person has the right to make and achieve his own choices the
result is anarchy and the dissolution of the whole."5 This is strange doctrine
from a liberal; it sounds much like the dictatorial dogma that no man but
one has a "right" to his own opinion; obviously it can be made to serve any
end. Yet, again, if the author's metaphysics is comprehensive enough, as
his arch defender alleges, to take in the most anti-metaphysical of our mod-
em philosophies, there might be profit in its study. It could be made a meta-
physics to end metaphysics, a faith to end faiths. "First principles," Pro-
fessor McKeon writes,6 "are frequently accepted by habit and inertia, or by
whim and emotional preference, or by authority, whether of church or acad-
emy or class." What President Hutchins advocates is "careful, laborious
examination of first principles with all the devices that reason or the assem-
bled experience of mankind can effect." 7 Such a study would undoubtedly
end in a frank confession of our ignorance of man and his universe and a
resolute determination to reduce that ignorance by scientific methods (not
omitting theory).
A final "imaginary horrible" brings us back to legal education. Too much
emphasis on jurisprudence could return legal scholars to the sterile dialectics
of an earlier day. What are these fundamental propositions and general
principles that can be taught apart from "practice" and yet enable the stu-
4. Clark, The Higher Learning in a Democracy (1937) 47 I::T. J. ETrHcS 317, 319.
5. Contrast the eloquent answer of Dean Clark, supra note 4, at 324: "In the
very words of the criticism leveled against present university education, it is both anti-
intellectual and vocational. It is anti-intellectual in that the scholar must conform not
to the demands which his own mind makes of him but to that metaphysics, that view
of the good life, which the university authorities set before him. It is vocational not
in any narrow sense of instructing in skills to be used next week or next year but in
the sense of training merely to get by, in conformity to set standards, with adventure
into unknown or unrationalized fields of knowledge taboo. These dangers, even if
merely potential, are too important to be lightly dismissed."
6. McKeon, loc. cit. supra note 2.
7. Ibid.
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dent "to think in the subject matter" of his discipline, to "meet practical
situations" not foreseen by his instructors? Speculative jurists have sought
them without success for over two thousand years. "Jurisprudence," a great
English authority on Roman law has written,8 "has no independent existence.
Its formulae are meaningless except in relation to concrete rules. It is a
part of the law." Even when removed from the transcendental and confined
to practical problems, jurisprudence-at least as exemplified in England and
America for the last century-is largely a monument to the folly of attempt-
ing to overpower "truth" by the formal analysis of circular legal doctrine.
Learned scholar after learned scholar has wasted his energies manipulating
rights, powers, privileges, immunities, liberties, duties, disabilities, liabilities,
and no rights, and composite concepts like ownership, possession, title, lien,
estate, entity and so forth, as if some manipulation of these concepts could,
and should, control the behavior of judges.0 These efforts have not been
wholly without effect; they have fortified tradition, have provided a com-
fortable faith in a government of laws and not of men, and have driven
weak or timid judges, because of the supposed inelasticity of the concepts,
to harsh decisions in particular cases; but they have done little to shed light
on the actual operation of our legal system or to give it new direction. Such
jurisprudence is, in the words of Thurman Arnold, "the shining but un-
fulfilled dream of a world governed by reason." 10 This ancient, impotent
jurisprudence is not, of course, the kind that President Hutchins is advocat-
ing. He demands a new and practicable jurisprudence; he would liberate
us from conventional legal absolutism. This new jurisprudence is to be, he
elaborates in a recent article,"' an "ordered relation" of three studies, "the
study of cases," "the study of how law operates in fact," and "the study of
legal philosophy." The study of how law operates in fact takes in the "eco-
nomical, social, and political" bases and effects of decisions; the study of
legal philosophy takes in psychology as well as the rational sciences of ethics
and politics. Just how jurisprudence is to supply this "ordered relation" or
how it is to be supplied to jurisprudence is not made clear; but the important
point is that in his positive program he simply reaffirms the "faith" of our
legal "realists." What he is after is, again, a broadening of horizons-a juris-
prudence to show the limitations of jurisprudence. "No law professor can
claim to be one," he now writes,' 2 "if he separates himself altogether from
the 'realistic' movement." His own contribution to the movement is, I think,
an incomprehensible verbal "screen" behind which the "realists" may be
able, if they are astute, to put their aspirations into practice. He has taken
the advice of the "neo-realists" to capture the weapons of the enemy and
8. Buckland, The Difficldties of Abstract Jurisprudence (1890) 6 L. Q. REV. 436,
438.
9. I do not belittle the destructive power of the Hohfeld system or the critical
labors of the scholars who have used that system to shave down "fundamental" con-
cepts and generalizations.
10. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935) 58.
11. Hutchins, Legal Education (1937) 4 UNIv. OF Cnl. L. REv. 357, 368.
12. Id. at 362.
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attack in the name of what you would reform.1 3 Whether the dangers in his
ambiguities are real remains to be seen; Barnum might even come to believe
in his own show.
THE HISTORY OF QUASI-CONTRACT IN ENGLISH*LAw. By R. M. Jackson.'
Cambridge: The University Press, 1936. Pp. -xxi, 134. $3.75.
IN the preface to his Tagore Law Lectures Dr. Winfield recalled the
temptation to which he had been put to devote them completely to the sub-
ject of quasi-contract, and though unfortunately he did not yield to this
half-formed intention, students were grateful for the searching examination
of the various causes of action said to be quasi ex contraclti which he did
provide in a chapter of that volume. A chapter did not permit him to deal
adequately with the beginnings and the development of quasi-contractual
relief, and it is to these that Mr. Jackson in the present volume has turned
his attention. Though the subject has been dealt with in parts by Langdell,
Ames, Street, and Sir William Holdsworth, there is available no detailed
historical account of quasi-contract in English law, a deficiency which goes
far to explain the difficulties modern lawyers and judges have found in
explaining these obligations and in assigning them a proper place in an
assumed precise dichotomy of tort and contract. The unfortunate Sinclair
v. Brougham2 is in large measure responsible both for the renewed interest
in the study of quasi-contractual obligations in England and for the present
day tendency to define quasi-contract in terms which exclude any reference
to a basis in contract, whether "fictional," "implied in law," or "construc-
tive," and proponents of this view have buttressed their argument by an
appeal to history in the person of Lord Mansfield. Thus Dr. Winfield has
pointed out that Lord Mansfield in Moses v. Macfcrlan3 altered the basis
of the action for money had and received by introducing a theory of aequum
et bonim to replace the theory of a contract implied in law.4 Dr. Hanbury
has likewise noticed that Lord Mansfield introduced notions of an equitable
character which gave the commonplace quasi-contractual obligation the ap-
pearance of an equitable institution enforced by common law remedies.5
And Mr. Fifoot, in a very recent book, regards Sinclair v. Broughamn as sub-
stituting at the basis of quasi-contract Lord Sumner's fictitious contract for
Lord Mansfield's unjust enrichment.0 These views Mr. Jackson finds doubt-
ful. Behind Lord 'Mansfield's oratorical flourishes he finds no abandonment
13. Hamilton, Book Review (1936) 142 NATio. 51, 52 [review of Aniora , Tim
Sym0IBLS OF GOVE.RNImENT (1935)].
1. Lecturer in Law, University of Cambridge.
2. [1914] A. C. 398.
3. 2 Burr. 1005 (1760).
4. T E PROVINCE OF THE LAW OF TORt (1931) 127, 134.
5. MoDRmN EQurry (1935) 93.
6. LoRD MANSFIELD (1936) 247-48.
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